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The Rhetoric of the Geometrical Method: 
Spinoza's Double Strategy 
Christopher P. Long 
A double strategy may be apprehended in the first definitions, axioms and 
propositions of Spinoza's Ethics: the one is rhetorical, the other, system- 
atic. Insofar as these opening passages constitute a geometrical argument 
that leads ultimately to the strict monism that lies at the heart of Spinoza's 
philosophy, they function systematically as grounding principles. However, 
insofar as they are designed to uncover errors at the heart of the Cartesian 
system, they function rhetorically as a critique of Descartes's equivocal 
theory of substance. The geometrical mode of presentation lends an aura 
of necessity to the systematic strategy and tends to eclipse the rhetorical 
strategy that functions as a critique of Cartesian dualism.1 To this extent, 
the systematic strategy itself functions rhetorically. On the other hand, to 
the extent that any seventeenth-century attempt to establish a monistic sys- 
tem would inevitably have had to involve a critique of Cartesian dualism, 
the rhetorical strategy itself functions systematically. Thus, although two 
distinct strategies are simultaneously discernible in the opening passages 
of the Ethics, the two work together, each arguing on a different front, to 
establish Spinoza's monism. By focusing on the rhetorical side of this double 
strategy, the underlying nature of Spinoza's critique of Descartes can be 
clarified and certain gaps in the systematic, geometrical argument for mo- 
nism can be explained. 
Descartes's theory of substance 
The rhetorical strategy Spinoza employs at the outset of the Ethics involves 
a brilliant use of equivocation and ambiguity designed to draw a reader 
dedicated to Cartesian dualism into the heart of an argument designed to 
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undermine this dualism itself. The impetus behind this rhetorical critique 
is surely Spinoza's dissatisfaction with Descartes's theory of substance. 
1. Descartes's equivocation 
Descartes's theory rests upon a fundamental equivocation: on the one hand, 
the term "substance" is meant strictly to designate that which is absolutely 
self-sufficient, namely, God; on the other hand, Descartes allows for a 
weaker understanding of substance, which pertains to those things (spe- 
cifically res cogitans and res extensa) that require only the concurrence of 
God in order to exist (Principles I, 51-52; AT VIIIA24-25).2 Thus, for 
Descartes, although God is, strictly speaking, the only substance, there re- 
mains a sense in which both res cogitans and res extensa may be under- 
stood as substances as well. 
Ultimately, this equivocal understanding of substance may be traced 
to a tension internal to Descartes between the Aristotelian notion of sub- 
stance as underlying subject and the seventeenth-century mutation of that 
notion, which came to be defined in terms of causal self-sufficiency.3 
Jonathan Bennett traces the source of this mutation back to the view held 
by Aristotle that the existence of some property depends upon its being 
instantiated - that is, there can be no courage unless there exists someone 
courageous. He continues his interesting argument thus: 
This suggests that there is a relation of dependence running from properties to 
the things that have them and not conversely. The dependence would be logi- 
cal: the thesis must be that "existent but uninstantiated property" is conceptu- 
ally defective, not merely contrary to physics. Thus, one mark of a genuine 
thing, or substance, is its not being logically dependent for its existence on 
anything else. (Bennett 1984, 56) 
The development of this line of thinking leads to the conception of sub- 
stance we find both in Descartes's Principles and in Spinoza's Ethics, 
namely, that a substance must not causally depend on anything outside of 
itself for its existence.4 However, with Descartes, what emerges out of this 
tradition is a hybrid understanding of substance in which the term "sub- 
stance" is not reserved simply for that which is utterly self-sufficient (God), 
but extends to those things that depend only upon the concurrence of God 
for their existence (res cogitans and res extensa). This bifurcated under- 
standing of substance seems to stem from the distinction at work in 
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Aristotle's Categories between primary and secondary substances. In the 
Categories, primary substances are identifiable individuals, like Socrates 
or an individual horse, while secondary substances are the species under 
which such primary substances fall.31 What Descartes seems to retain from 
this conception is both the assumption that there exists a plurality of indi- 
vidual substances as well as the tendency to equivocally employ the term 
"substance" itself.32 Let us consider the latter tendency first. 
2. Double dualism 
In Principles I, 51, Descartes warns the reader that ". . . the term 'sub- 
stance' does not apply univocally ... to God and to other things; that is, 
there is no distinctly intelligible meaning of the term which is common to 
God and his creatures" (AT VIIIA 24). Thus, a fundamental heterogeneity 
between God and "his creatures" marks the first of what may be consid- 
ered a double dualism in Descartes. Here there is a vertical dualism based 
upon the ontological distinction between that which is purely self-caused 
and that which relies on something else for its existence. The ontological 
hierarchy that underlies this vocabulary posits God as the highest being 
and his creatures as ontologically dependent upon God. Whereas the strict 
definition of substance establishes this vertical dualism, the equivocation 
by which the status of "substance" is ascribed to those created things that 
require only the concurrence of God to exist, establishes a second dualism. 
This horizontal dualism refers to a bifurcation limited to the ontological 
level of created things. On the horizontal level, there are only two things 
entitled to be called "substance:" res cogitans and res extensa. Here, the 
term "substance" applies univocally to both mind and body. The weaker 
sense in which these two things may be considered substances is discussed 
by Descartes in a passage that not only indicates the nature of the horizon- 
tal dualism, but also lends insight into the Cartesian position concerning 
the role of attributes: 
as for corporeal substance and mind (or created thinking substance), these 
can be understood to fall under this common concept: things that need only 
the concurrence of God in order to exist. However, we cannot initially be- 
come aware of a substance merely through its being an existing thing, since 
this alone does not of itself have any effect on us. We can, however, easily 
come to know a substance by one of its attributes, in virtue of the common 
notion that nothingness possesses no attributes, that is to say, no properties or 
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qualities. Thus, if we perceive the presence of some attribute, we can infer 
that there must also be present an existing thing or substance to which it may 
be attributed. (AT Vili A 25; emphasis added) 
There are two striking aspects to this passage; first, Descartes's definition 
of substance as applied to res cogitans and res extensa is similar to his 
definition of God insofar as the requisite factor is a sort of causal self- 
sufficiency. What justifies Descartes's calling these two things "substance" 
is their peculiar status as things that require only the "concurrence of God 
in order to exist." The second thing to be noticed in the above passage is 
what Descartes says concerning the role of attributes. Here he seems to 
draw a distinction that appears to be collapsed in Spinoza, for Descartes 
suggests that there is a difference between the existence of a thing and our 
knowledge of it - that is, its ontological status is independent of our epis- 
temological access to it. This, however, is not the case for Spinoza: "By 
substance I understand what is in itself and conceived through itself9 (ID3). 
Here already, Spinoza is stressing causal self-sufficiency as the criterion 
for calling a thing "substance." Not only is substance the cause of its own 
existence, but also, as a concept, it is self-grounding: one may not appre- 
hend it through any aggregate concepts. However, like Descartes, in his 
definition of attribute, Spinoza does seem to stress the epistemological side: 
"By attribute I understand what the intellect perceives of a substance, as 
constituting its essence" (ID4). Although this definition is much disputed, 
I appeal to it here only to suggest that the notion of attribute used by Spinoza 
is not radically different from the one used by Descartes. In both, not only 
is the emphasis placed on the way in which a substance is accessible to the 
mind, but also, it is the attribute that in some sense constitutes the essence 
of the substance. This may be seen if Spinoza's "attribute" is mapped against 
Descartes's "principle property." In Principles I, 53, Descartes writes: 
To each substance there belongs one principle attribute; in the case of mind, 
this is thought, and in the case of body it is extension. A substance may indeed 
be known through any attribute at all; but each substance has one principle 
property which constitutes its nature and essence, and to which all its proper- 
ties are referred. (AT VIIIA 25) 
Here, there is a striking similarity of vocabulary; both Spinoza and 
Descartes contend that an attribute constitutes the essence of a substance. 
This linguistic affinity points already to the very heart of Spinoza's rhe- 
torical strategy. By employing this good Cartesian vocabulary, Spinoza is 
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able to seduce the Cartesian reader into accepting the argument even as he 
subtly hones the meaning of substance, attribute, and mode. Although 
Bennett suggests that in ID4 Spinoza ought not to have used the term "es- 
sence" because it does not seem to carry the same meaning it does in IID2 
(i.e. that of necessary and sufficient condition),7 I disagree. The problem, 
Bennett asserts, is that if "essence" did mean "necessary and sufficient 
condition" in ID4, Spinoza would not need to argue in IP5D for the con- 
clusion that no two substances can share an attribute.8 When viewed ex- 
clusively from the perspective of the logically rigorous systematic strategy, 
perhaps Bennett is correct; however, such a reading fails to recognize the 
rhetorical strategy underlying the opening passages of the Ethics. This 
rhetorical strategy involves the intriguing use of dual language and ambi- 
guity in order to subtly entice a good Cartesian into the flow of the argu- 
ment for monism. When seen in this light, Spinoza's choice of the word 
"essence" in ID4 is far from ill considered, but rather indicates a shrewd 
and powerful linguistic maneuver. Spinoza consciously opts to use the term 
"essence" here, not necessarily in the strict sense in which it will be used 
in IID2 or IIP 1 OS but, rather, in order to implicitly link his understanding 
of attribute to Descartes's own definition as expressed in the Principles. 
While Bennett takes the fact that Spinoza does not define "essence" until 
IID2 as a condescension (Bennett 1984, 61), another explanation is pos- 
sible based on a sufficient appreciation of the rhetorical strategy operating 
alongside the systematic, strictly logical argument. Further, as will be seen, 
by employing the term "essence" in this quasi-Cartesian sense, Spinoza 
implicitly points precisely to the ambiguity in Descartes's theory of sub- 
stance that he will ultimately undermine in order to establish God as the 
univocal substance; namely, the notion that there exists two substances each 
with its own essence. 
Thus, the rhetorical strategy, evident already at the outset of the Eth- 
ics, points to the heart of Spinoza's critique of Descartes. Not accidentally, 
it is directed precisely at the center of Descartes' theory of substance and 
takes the form of an apparent agreement. The use of similar language dis- 
guises Spinoza's underlying intent - to undermine the ambiguities endemic 
to the Cartesian theory of substance. The fundamental ambiguity Spinoza 
will exploit, however, is not Descartes's double dualism as much as it is 
his pluralism - the notion that there may be a plurality of substances with 
the same essential property. A deeper investigation into Descartes's theory 
of substance and the lack of coherence it engenders will further elucidate 
the impetus behind Spinoza's rhetorical critique. 
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3. Pluralism 
The peculiar double dualism endemic to Descartes's theory of substance 
turns, in many passages, into a pluralism as a result of the Aristotelian 
strain haunting his system. The influence of the Categories has already 
been suggested, and it is perhaps nowhere more obvious than in those pas- 
sages in which Descartes dubs individual thinking things and individual 
extended things "substances." In the third meditation he writes, 
I think that a stone is a substance, or is a thing capable of existing indepen- 
dently, and I also think that I am a substance. Admittedly I conceive of myself 
as a thing that thinks and is not extended, whereas I conceive of the stone as a 
thing that is extended and does not think, so that the two conceptions differ 
enormously; but they seem to agree with respect to the classification "sub- 
stance." (AT VII 44) 
The term "substance" is overworked by Descartes throughout. It is not suf- 
ficient that in its strongest sense it refers to God exclusively and then, in a 
weaker sense, to both res cogitans and res extensa in general; but now, as 
this passage suggests, it applies to individual thinking things and even, it 
seems, to individual extended things. Descartes's assumption is that there 
is a plurality of substances with the same principle property. Further evi- 
dence for this is found in Principles I, 60: 
from the mere fact that each of us understands himself to be a thinking thing 
and is capable, in thought, of excluding from himself every other substance, 
whether thinking or extended, it is certain that each of us, regarded in this 
way, is really distinct from every other thinking substance and from every 
corporeal substance. (AT VIIIA 29) 
From this, it seems clear that Descartes would have considered each indi- 
vidual person a distinct thinking substance, thus allowing for a plurality of 
thinking substances. The case of extended substance is less straightfor- 
ward, as Descartes seems to vacillate between two quite different posi- 
tions. On the one hand, as the above passage from the Meditations suggests, 
he seems to consider as substances individual material things like stones. 
On the other hand, in the synopsis to the Meditations he writes: 
we need to recognize that body, taken in a general sense, is a substance, so 
that it too never perishes. But the human body, insofar as it differs from other 
bodies, is simply made up of a certain configuration of limbs and other acci- 
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dents of this sort; whereas the human mind is not made up of any accidents in 
this way, but is a pure substance. (AT VII 14) 
Here the term "substance" is reserved for body "taken in general," while 
the specific human body would perhaps be considered in some sense a 
modification of this substance. This is not unlike what Spinoza will in fact 
contend on a much broader scale; he considers individual bodies to be modes 
of God's attribute of extension.9 Descartes's strange vacillation concern- 
ing the precise number of extended substances may be the result of the 
specter of Aristotle; for the tendency to call individual things substances 
as well as to treat res cogitons and res extensa as generic substances under 
which individual substances fall is consistent with Aristotle's view in the 
Categories, Furthermore, it is clear that Descartes grants substance status 
to both res cogitans taken in general and to individual thinking things, 
thereby reaffirming the equivocation endemic to Aristotle's view in the 
Categories. The temptation to treat res extensa in this manner as well would 
perhaps have been quite strong. Even so, whatever his final position con- 
cerning extended substance in fact is, a strong pluralism remains identifi- 
able with regard to res cogitans. The Aristotelian tension in Descartes, then, 
seems to account both for the equivocal conception of substance endemic 
to his double dualism, and for the transformation of the horizontal dualism 
into a pluralism. One way, therefore, to thematize the direction of Spinoza's 
rhetorical strategy would be to say that it is designed to purge the specter 
of Aristotle from Descartes's theory of substance by collapsing the double 
dualism and pluralism into a strict monism. This, in itself, is no great rev- 
elation. However, the manner in which Spinoza undermines Descartes's 
pluralism by implicitly affirming a basic Cartesian assumption - namely, 
that each substance has only one principle property or attribute - reveals 
the extent to which Spinoza's rhetorical strategy often eclipses the logical 
progression of the purely systematic strategy. 
Spinoza's rhetorical strategy 
In his monograph, Behind the Geometrical Method, Edwin Curley sug- 
gests that "some of the most distinctive features of Spinoza's philosophy 
arose from internal tensions within the Cartesian system" (4). For this rea- 
son, Curley chooses to approach Spinoza's argument for monism from a 
Cartesian perspective. His method is to trace precisely when and how the 
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Cartesian departs from the Spinozistic metaphysic. In so doing, however, 
Curley implicitly uncovers what is here being called the "rhetorical" side 
of the double strategy at work in the opening propositions of the Ethics. In 
the following section, I will trace Curley's reconstruction of the manner in 
which a potential Cartesian reader of Spinoza's Ethics would have reacted 
to its opening passages not, as Curley himself suggests, in order to show 
"that a very natural way of looking at the world contains within it the seeds 
of Spinozism" (Curley 8), but, rather, in order to suggest that the argument 
for monism is rhetorically designed to entice the Cartesian into the heart of 
an argument designed to rectify the incoherence endemic to the Cartesian 
theory of substance. 
l.The argument 
The conclusion of Spinoza's argument for monism is to be found in propo- 
sition 14: "Except God, no substance can be or be conceived." Although 
this statement is obviously anathema to Cartesian dualism, the argument 
from which it is concluded is less obviously anti-Cartesian. There is a no- 
ticeable Cartesian flavor to the propositions from which IP 14 derives: IP1 1, 
ID6, and IP5. It is the argument surrounding proposition 5 that will prove 
decisive with regard to Descartes. As Curley (10) suggests, if we assume 
that Descartes would have accepted ID6, "By God I understand a being 
absolutely infinite, i.e., a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, 
of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence" then he would 
certainly have no problems with IP11, "God, or a substance consisting of 
infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, 
necessarily exists." Curley This assumption is admittedly somewhat spuri- 
ous, but Curley argues that Descartes would have a difficult time rejecting 
it because of the strategy he himself employs to define God throughout the 
Meditations. This strategy involves both the enumeration of God's attributes 
and the application of the principle that defines God as a supremely perfect 
and infinite being (AT VII 46). The attributes that apply to God are deter- 
mined by this principle of supreme perfection, and it seems inconsequen- 
tial for Descartes that the list of attributes so generated is not exhaustive.10 
Curley suggests that this is not far from Spinoza's position in ID6: 
If God is supremely perfect, we cannot conceive of him as lacking any prop- 
erty which involves any perfection, and we must conceive of him as possess- 
ing each such property in a way which does not involve any limitation. That 
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is, if God is supremely perfect, he must be absolutely infinite in the sense in 
which Spinoza understands that term [in ID6]. (Curley 22) 
Let it be granted that Descartes would at least not have rejected IP14 
on the grounds of IP 11 or ID6, for there is significant evidence that his 
own view leaves room for a definition of God that affirms his infinite at- 
tributes.11 Therefore, Curley focuses his attention on IP5, "In nature there 
cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute." In this 
proposition, both Spinoza's brilliant use of equivocation and the move be- 
yond a Cartesian position is manifest. 
The argument for IP5 depends heavily upon IP4, "Two or more dis- 
tinct things are distinguished from one another, either by a difference in 
the attributes of the substance or by a difference in their affections" Inter- 
estingly, in the demonstration Spinoza appeals to an axiom (IA1) and two 
definitions (ID3 and ID5), all of which Descartes would certainly have 
affirmed. Axiom 1 simply states an assumption held by most seventeenth- 
century thinkers including Descartes: "Whatever is, is either in itself or in 
another" ID3 is Spinoza's definition of substance, which, as I have men- 
tioned, would not have caused Descartes any undue concern, since his own 
strict definition of substance is quite similar.12 ID5 is Spinoza's definition 
of mode. Again we find a striking similarity in vocabulary between 
Descartes and Spinoza. In the Principles Descartes defines modes this way: 
"we employ the term mode when we are thinking of a substance as being 
affected or modified" (AT VIIIA 26). In ID5, Spinoza writes: "By mode I 
understand the affections of a substance, or that which is in another through 
which it is also conceived" Descartes would have accepted the three sources 
Spinoza appeals to in the demonstration for IP4. However, these premises 
are employed to develop a position that is essentially anti-Cartesian. The 
rhetorically critical strategy is, then, already recognizable in Spinoza's 
demonstration for IP4: 
Whatever is, is either in itself or in another (by IA1), i.e. (by ID3 and ID5), 
outside the intellect there is nothing except substances and their affections. 
Therefore, there is nothing outside the intellect through which a number of 
things can be distinguished from one another except substances, or what is 
the same (by ID4), their attributes, and their affections, q.e.d. 
Spinoza's claim here amounts to a denial of any real distinction between 
things in the Cartesian sense. In the Principles, Descartes identifies three 
kinds of distinction: real, conceptual (or by reason) and modal. A real dis- 
tinction, he claims, "exists only between two or more substances; and we 
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can perceive that two substances are really distinct simply from the fact 
that we can clearly and distinctly understand one apart from the other" (AT 
VIIIA 28). However, in proposition 4, although Spinoza seems to grant 
that there may be "two or more substances," he goes on to argue that these 
substances may only be distinguished by a difference in their attributes or 
by a difference in their affections. On Descartes's own terms, this would 
mean that either a distinction of reason or a modal distinction holds be- 
tween two substances. This is precisely Spinoza's point in the demonstra- 
tion, for the claim lurking behind this position is that there is only one 
substance. What for Descartes were two distinct substances {res cogitans 
and res extensa) are for Spinoza simply attributes of one substance, God. 
Here, the strategic impetus behind the interesting, and potentially prob- 
lematic, identification of "substances" with "attributes" in this passage 
comes into focus: at the outset of the demonstration for IP4 Spinoza ex- 
plicitly speaks the dualistic language of Descartes yet, by the end of the 
demonstration he has surreptitiously indicated the direction of his argu- 
ment. The swift and subtle identification of substances with attributes al- 
ready suggests Spinoza's official position that res extensa and res cogitans 
are attributes of God. With this strategic maneuver, Spinoza has taken ad- 
vantage of the horizontal dualism established by Descartes's equivocal use 
of the term "substance"; for by employing "substances" in the plural, 
Spinoza implicitly refers to the weaker sense of substance. When he iden- 
tifies these substances with attributes, he implicitly calls into question the 
very possibility of the substantial difference endemic to Descartes's hori- 
zontal dualism. 
Although Spinoza subtly indicates the direction of his argument in 
IP4, the Cartesian reader may still be convinced to accept this proposition 
because of its inherent ambiguity. Indeed, even the identification of sub- 
stances with attributes has precedence in Descartes. As Curley suggests, 
Descartes's official position is that the distinction between the two is merely 
one of reason: 
a conceptual distinction [i.e., a distinction of reason] is a distinction between 
a substance and some attribute of that substance without which the substance 
is unintelligible . . . such a distinction is recognized by our inability to form a 
clear and distinct idea of the substance if we exclude from it the attribute in 
question. (AT VIIIA 30) 
With this it seems as if our very ability to conceive of a substance is para- 
sitic upon our ability to apprehend its attribute. If this is in fact the case, it 
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would appear that in order to conceive the thing at all we would need to 
conceive it as having that principle attribute. Thus, the claim that an intel- 
lect cannot distinguish things by anything other than their attributes or their 
affections would perhaps be acceptable to the Cartesian.13 
The argument for monism, then, seems to come down to proposition 
5, for it remains possible to convince a good Cartesian to accept each of 
the other premises upon which IP 14 rests. Proposition 5 asserts: "In nature 
there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute" 
The demonstration begins simply with a restatement of proposition 4 and 
then proceeds to consider the specific possibilities presented in that propo- 
sition. First, what follows from the assumption that we can distinguish be- 
tween things only by a difference in their attributes? Spinoza concludes 
that if this is the only distinguishing factor, then "it will be conceded that 
there is only one of the same attribute." Curley suggests that there seems 
to be a tacit assumption here, which is elucidated by the objection leveled 
by Leibniz against this step of the demonstration. Leibniz asks why there 
can't be two substances, one with attributes A and B, the other with at- 
tributes  and C. In this case, although the substances have the same at- 
tribute, they can still be distinguished on the basis of that attribute which 
they do not have in common, namely either A or C (Curley 15). This seems 
reasonable if it is assumed that a substance can have more than one at- 
tribute. Certainly, Spinoza suggests just such a possibility already in ID6 
when he claims that God is a substance consisting of infinite attributes. 
However, a possible response to this issue is hinted at in Spinoza's restate- 
ment of this proposition in the demonstration of IP8, "A substance of one 
attribute does not exist unless it is unique (IP5)," which suggests that in 
IP5 Spinoza was operating on the Cartesian assumption that there is only 
one attribute for each substance. If this is indeed the case, then it seems 
that the good Cartesian would fall victim to this argument. If each sub- 
stance only has one attribute (or principle property) and the only thing 
differentiating the two substances is a difference in their attributes, then it 
follows that there is only one of the same attribute.14 It would be difficult 
to see how a Cartesian would explain how one being could remain one 
being while having two attributes. As Curley points out, on Descartes's 
view, there is no conception of substance save through its principle prop- 
erty, "so what are we saying of a substance when we say that it is one, yet 
has two properties?" (Curley 16) It appears as if the Cartesian would end 
up deriving a conclusion that he would reject, namely that there are no two 
substances with the same attribute, from propositions that he, arguably, 
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would accept. Furthermore, Spinoza is attacking the Cartesian system pre- 
cisely at the point where it turns from a dualism to a pluralism; this propo- 
sition is designed to deny that individual things like Socrates or Callias 
deserve the label "substance." The Cartesian, on the other hand, would like 
to consider them distinct substances with the same attribute, namely, 
thought. This, Spinoza has argued, is not possible. 
There is, however, a significant problem with this reading of the 
first part of the demonstration for proposition 5. As Bennett (69) points 
out, the demonstration for proposition 14 depends on combining the premise, 
"there is a substance consisting of infinite attributes," with proposition 5, 
"two substances cannot share any attribute." From this premise and propo- 
sition, Spinoza concludes that there is only one substance, but one with 
infinite attributes. However, if proposition 5 was based on the assumption 
that there is only one attribute for each substance, then there seems to be 
an essential contradiction built into the argument for monism. Perhaps the 
ambiguities inherent in this argument derive from the rhetorical strategy 
Spinoza employs throughout. If he is attempting to draw the good Carte- 
sian into the argument for monism, it would be expedient for him to im- 
plicitly endorse the Cartesian assumption that each substance has one 
principle property that constitutes its essence, although his own position 
posits that there is only one substance but with infinite attributes express- 
ing its infinite essence. While IP5 is geared outwardly to the specific Car- 
tesian assumption that each substance has only one principle property, its 
inner logic seems based upon the contention that if there were indeed two 
substances sharing the same attribute, they would limit one another and 
thus would not be, by definition, substances. Indeed, Spinoza's own defi- 
nition of substance requires that it be infinite (IP8) and by ID2,15 if some- 
thing is limited by another of the same nature, it is finite. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that when Spinoza appeals to IP5 in the demonstration for 
IP14, he treats the very notion of two substances with the same attribute as 
"absurd": 
Since God is an absolutely infinite being, of whom no attribute which ex- 
presses an essence of substance can be denied (by ID6), and he necessarily 
exists (by IP1 1), if there were any substances except God, it would have to be 
explained through some attribute of God, and so two substances of the same 
attribute would exist, which (by IP5) is absurd. 
By ID2 this is not only absurd but self -contradictory: it is tantamount to 
saying that something which by definition is infinite (substance) is finite. 
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Spinoza did not opt to explicitly argue in this manner; rather, in IP5, he 
attempted to exploit the Cartesian assumption that each substance has one 
principle property that constitutes its essence. Therefore, a strange dynamic 
is evident in Spinoza's argument for monism: the inner logic of this argu- 
ment is not always the logic offered explicitly. Thus, in IP5, although 
Spinoza argues in such a way as to refute Descartes's pluralism while out- 
wardly adhering to the Cartesian assumption that each substance has one 
attribute (IP8D), he could have argued for IP5 without recourse to the one 
substance one attribute position. Indeed, ID2 already provided him with 
the requisite premise from which to conclude that if two or more substances 
had the same attribute they would limit each other and would not, by defi- 
nition, be substances. Furthermore, if we understand the term "essence" in 
ID4 in the manner in which Spinoza defines it in IID2 (that is, a necessary 
and sufficient condition), the argument in IP5 becomes superfluous, since 
"attribute" would already be defined in such a way as to deny the possibil- 
ity that two substances could share the same attribute (Bennett 61). Thus, 
Spinoza already had the premise he needed to argue for IP 14 ("two sub- 
stances cannot share any attribute") without committing himself to the one 
attribute, one substance position. That he opted to argue extensively for 
IP5 on the basis of this Cartesian position indicates the rhetorical strategy 
of his argument. This rhetorical critique of Descartes culminates in IP5, in 
which Spinoza, arguing in explicitly Cartesian terms, denies the possibil- 
ity of ascribing the term "substance" to individual finite things. Within the 
scope of the argument for monism in general, IP5 marks the decisive mo- 
ment in which Descartes's theory of substance is superseded and a more 
rigorous, univocal conception of substance is established. It is here that 
Aristotelian tension behind Descartes's pluralism is effectively denied. 
This more rigorous conception of substance has far-reaching ramifi- 
cations. By establishing God as the only substance, Spinoza is able to de- 
velop a theory of substance that is far more consistent than Descartes's. As 
we have seen, the inconsistencies endemic to Descartes's dualism arise out 
of a deep tension between two different theories of substance, the one es- 
sentially Aristotelian, the other characteristic of the seventeenth century. 
Spinoza's argument for monism amounts to the rejection of the specter of 
Aristotle in favor of the seventeenth-century conception, which defines 
substance strictly in terms of causal self-sufficiency. 
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2. Double Strategy 
In establishing this conception of substance, Spinoza needed not only to 
construct a logically sound argument, but also to subvert the Cartesian du- 
alism that was quickly establishing itself as the common sense view of the 
world. Spinoza's argument for monism, while it employs the geometrical 
method in order to establish the fundamental grounding principles of his 
philosophy, also offers a subtle and decisive critique of Descartes's equivo- 
cal theory of substance. The rhetorical strategy of critique and the system- 
atic strategy directed toward the establishment of a strict monism function 
together to both elucidate and eradicate certain inconsistencies endemic to 
the Cartesian system. This double strategy also accounts for the peculiar 
asymmetry between the inner logic of Spinoza's argument for monism and 
the explicit manner in which he chooses to develop this argument. On the 
one hand, from the outset, Spinoza is dedicated to establishing God as the 
only substance. Indeed, this may already be seen in the first definition of 
the Ethics: "By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves 
existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing" 
Here, already an implicit appeal to God is established in such a way as to 
conform to the seventeenth-century conception of substance defined in terms 
of strict causal self-sufficiency. This points to the goal of the system-ground- 
ing strategy employed by Spinoza. On the other hand, the explicit argu- 
ment for monism involves significant gestures to Cartesian dogma. Spinoza 
is found speaking with a strong Cartesian accent in his definitions of sub- 
stance, attribute, and mode. In IP5, he precisely calibrates the argument so 
as to coincide, at least apparently, with the Cartesian assumption that each 
substance has only one principle property. The faint polemical tone of these 
opening passages and the equivocal use of Cartesian language indicate the 
second aspect of Spinoza's double strategy: the rhetorical critique of 
Descartes. The impetus behind this critique was twofold. First, as we have 
seen, Descartes's theory of substance is inherently inconsistent. Spinoza 
surely would have been aware of the incoherence engendered by such an 
equivocal understanding of substance. He, too, saw the inherent advan- 
tages of a more rigorous understanding of substance in addressing the pe- 
rennial problems haunting Cartesian philosophy. The second impetus behind 
the critical strategy was perhaps more political, for any attempt to estab- 
lish a monistic philosophy in the seventeenth century would have inevita- 
bly had to defend itself against Cartesian dualism. The opening of the Ethics 
already anticipates its opponents' criticisms by arguing in a language and, 
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indeed, in a manner that would have found some resonance with them. 
Thus, Spinoza hides a sophisticated rhetorical apparatus behind the objec- 
tive geometrical method. By opting to argue not only in terms familiar to a 
Cartesian reader, but also, at times, with Cartesian assumptions, he is able 
to surreptitiously undermine the entire Cartesian system. The order of the 
propositions, the language employed and, indeed, the strategic silence with 
regard to certain key terms such as "essence" are the tools of Spinoza's 
rhetorical critique. Yet these are precisely the tools employed to argue for 
the monism that lies at the ground of his system. Together, the two strate- 
gies of rhetorical critique and systematic grounding account for the pecu- 
liar difficulties surrounding Spinoza's argument for monism and mark the 
underlying brilliance endemic to the opening passages of the Ethics. To 
see in these passages only the logical progression of the geometrical argu- 
ment is to fall victim to the very rhetoric it is designed to eclipse; it is to 
fail to recognize one of the most expedient tools Spinoza employs in estab- 
lishing his argument for monism. 
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Notes 
1. In The Philosophy of Spinoza, Harry Wolf son points to the rhetorical dimension of 
Spinoza's geometrical method when he argues that one of the reasons Spinoza may have 
opted for this literary form was to avoid the need to explicitly lay out and argue against each 
of the positions of his opponents - as would have been required had he followed the meth- 
ods of the scholastic and rabbinical traditions. Wolfson (58) suggests that Spinoza did not 
like to explicitly expose the errors of others. What Wolfson does not explicitly develop is the 
manner in which the geometrical method itself functions rhetorically to implicitly expose 
the errors of others. This rhetorical strategy is most perspicuously seen if we follow Edwin 
Curley's suggestion that the early passages of the Ethics are fundamentally guided by 
Spinoza's deep engagement with Cartesian philosophy (Curley 8). 
2. All quotations from Descartes are taken from Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch 
and will be cited in the text according to the standard Adam and Tannery (AT) edition of the 
Oeuvres de Descartes. 
3. See Bennett 55-56. 
4. See AT VIIIA 24 (Principles, 5 1 ) and Ethics ID3. All quotations for Spinoza are taken 
from The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 1. Edwin Curley, trans. References to the Ethics 
are cited in the text according book, definition/proposition/axiom number and scholium/ 
demonstration/corollary. 
5. See 2bl5-ff., Minio-Paluello. 
6. It is striking that in the transformation of the theory of substance from Aristotle to 
Descartes a hierarchical reversal seems to have occurred; for while Aristotle considered 
individual things like Callias, Socrates, and even individual horses as primary substances in 
the Categories, Descartes and especially Spinoza use the term to indicate the highest be- 
ing - God. The upward mobility of the concept of substance throughout the centuries, that 
is, its ascent from individual horses to God is perhaps not as strange as it might first appear 
to be; for the common feature of substance as individual and substance as God is precisely 
the notion that whatever is called "substance" is that principle which itself depends on no 
SPINOZA'S DOUBLE STRATEGY 307 
other being for its existence. Descartes's theory of substance seems to be caught in the con- 
fusion of this transition, for he is forced to affirm an equivocal conception of substance 
precisely in order to hold onto both God and individual things as substances. 
7. Definition 2 of Book II begins: "I say that to the essence of any thing belongs that 
which, being given, the thing is necessarily posited and which, being taken away, the thing 
is necessarily taken away." 
8. Bennett writes: "If Spinoza were defining 'attribute' so as to secure that if  has at- 
tribute A then nothing else can have A, he would not have needed a later, intricate argument 
for the conclusion that no two substances can share an attribute. (IP5D)" (61). 
9. SeeIP25CandIIDl. 
10. Curley quotes from the Meditations: "Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive that is 
real and true and implies some perfection, the whole of it is contained in this idea [of a 
supremely perfect being]. It does not matter that I do not comprehend the infinite, or that 
there are innumerable things in God which I cannot comprehend, and perhaps will not even 
be able to attain any conception of." (AT VII, 46), (Curley 1988, 22). For examples of 
Descartes's strategy of enumerating God's attributes, see AT 40, and 45. For Descartes's 
contention that God has many attributes, see Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, AT VIIIB, 
348. 
11. Indeed, Curley suggests that Spinoza infers his definition of God directly from 
Descartes's by citing an early letter of Spinoza's: "I define God as a being consisting of 
infinite attributes, each of which is infinite, or supremely perfect, in its kind . . .That this is 
a true definition of God is clear from the fact that by God we understand a being supremely 
perfect and absolutely infinite" (Letter 2, IV/ 7/ 24-8/ 3); (Curley 1988, 23). 
12. Descartes's strict definition of substance runs as follows: "By substance we can un- 
derstand nothing other than a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing 
for its existence" (ATVIIIA, 24). Spinoza's definition at ID3 runs: "By substance I under- 
stand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i. e., that whose concept does not 
require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed." 
13. Curley develops this line of argument on page 13 and the following. 
14. Bennett suggests that, in an analogous manner, if I can only have one father and "if I 
don't share all my fathers with you then I share no fathers with you" (69). 
15. ID2: "That thing is said to be finite in its own kind that can be limited by another of the 
same nature." 
Works Cited 
Aristotle. 1949. Aristotelis Categoriae. Ed. L. Minio-Paluello. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Bennett, Jonathan. 1984. A Study of Spinoza's Ethics. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing 
Company. 
Curley, Edwin. 1988. Behind the Geometrical Method. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Descartes, Rene. 1984. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Trans. John Cottingham, 
Robert Stoothff, and Dugald Murdoch. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

			 . 1985. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Trans. John Cottingham, Robert 
Stoothff, and Dugald Murdoch. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

			 . 1991. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Trans. John Cottingham, Robert 
Stoothff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny. Vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- 
sity Press. 
Spinoza, Benedict de. 1985. The Collected Works of Spinoza. Trans. Edwin Curley. Vol. I. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Wolf son, Harry. 1962. The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processes of His 
Reasoning. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
